This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and proposes a model to examine the relationship between product market competition and the level of innovative activity in an industry. Recent empirical papers point to an inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation. Our paper o¤ers theoretical support for these results while employing a more accurate de…nition of innovation than the previous literature; more precisely, we isolate innovation from riskless technological progress. The …rms in our model learn of an invention and decide on whether and when to innovate. In making this decision, …rms face a trade-o¤ between seeking a …rst-mover advantage and waiting to acquire more information. By recognizing that a …rm can intensify its innovative activity on two dimensions, a risk dimension and a quantitative dimension, we show that …rms solve this trade-o¤ precisely so as to generate the inverted-U shape relationship. When the competition in the pre-innovation market is su¢ ciently high, the level of competition in the post-innovation market is endogenous. We investigate the welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure and …nd conditions that determine the socially optimal level of competition. We study the e¤ects that the degree of technological spread in the industry has on innovation and highlight the roles that strategic uncertainty and the discreteness of the information acquisition process play in this context. JEL Clasi¢ cation: D40, L10
Introduction
This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and employs the resulting model to investigate the relationship between the degree of competition in an industry and the level of innovative activity. The clear policy implications of the nature of this relationship generated a large body of literature investigating it. Starting with the seminal work of Schumpeter(1943) , the objective of these studies has been to determine whether there is an optimal market structure that results in the highest rate of technological advance. In particular, this literature tried to reconcile the intuitive appeal of the Schumpeter's assertion that only large …rms possessing a signi…cant amount of monopoly power have the resources and incentives to engage in risky innovative activity, with a substantial amount of empirical literature that suggested the opposite. Although results vary, more recent empirical papers, such as Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005) (henceforth, ABBGH (2005)) suggest an inverted-U shape relationship between product market competition and innovation. 1 According to these studies, for low levels of competition an increase in competition induces more innovation, while for higher values of competition, as competition increases, …rms become less innovative.
Our paper adopts a microeconomic approach and studies the innovation process at …rm level by following a new project through its stages of development. The …rms in our dynamic model become sequentially aware of an invention and decide on whether and when to undertake a costly investment in innovation. In making this decision, …rms face a trade-o¤ between seeking a …rst-mover advantage and waiting to acquire more information. There are a number of novel contributions that our study brings to the literature on innovation. First, we identify the trade-o¤ between information acquisition and competitive pressure as su¢ cient to generate the empirically observed inverted-U shape relationship. Second, we project the level of innovative activity on two dimensions, a risk dimension and a quantitative dimension, and unveil the e¤ect of this breakdown in explaining that relationship. Third, our model o¤ers theoretical support to the newest empirical …ndings while employing a more accurate de…nition of innovation than the one used in ABBGH (2005) , which is the only other paper to present a theoretical model that obtains the inverted-U shape relationship. 2 More precisely, the results in ABBGH(2005) hinge on including in the de…nition of innovation the technological advancements made at no cost by laggard …rms who copy the technology of the leader. 3 In contrast, the de…nition in our model is consistent with the standard interpretation of innovation as being something new, di¤erent and usually better than what existed before. 4 We therefore isolate the innovative activity from riskless technological progress. Finally, we also study the e¤ects that the degree of technological spread in the industry has on innovation and highlight the roles that strategic uncertainty and the discreteness of the information acquisition play in this context. 5 The typical stages in the development of a new commercial product or process are presented in the following …gure: 6 Applied research is aimed at gaining knowledge that will address a speci…c problem or meet a speci…c need within the scope of that particular entity; successful applied research results in an invention or the discovery of an idea that should work. In the invention stage, the idea also passes through its …rst tests. This is the research part of the phrase "research and development". The product development, also called the innovation stage, is the …rst commercial application of an invention; it requires re…nement of the invention and the developing of a marketable product. Large R&D labs spend most of their resources on innovation. 7 The ideas generated through applied main monotonicity result does not hold anymore unless the hazard rate of these events is insigni…cant. However, for small values of this hazard rate, it is straightforward to see that their model predicts that the industry structure will be such that the Schumpeterian e¤ect will always dominate. 4 Schumpeter(1934) de…nes economic innovation as the introduction of a new good, the introduction of a new method of production, the opening of a new market, the use of a new input of production or the implementation of a new organizational structure. 5 Also, our model can be seen as a study of product innovation in which new products are introduced in the market. This di¤ers from most of the current theoretical literature on innovation, including ABBGH (2005) , which focuses on the study of technological advancements that consist of process innovations in which existing products are produced at a lower average cost. 6 See Mans…eld (1968b) for an excellent in depth analysis of the innovation decision making at …rm level. 7 For instance, of the $208. research go through a screening process and a small share of them end up being implemented in marketable products. 8 The model in our paper has a set of …rms who, sequentially, become informed about an invention that could render future gains to its investors, provided that it is a success from technological and business standpoints. Once a …rm learns of the invention, it has the option of investing in the project at any time. Initially, the …rm's knowledge about the feasibility of the project is scarce, so investment is relatively risky. 9 As time passes, the …rm acquires additional information, and is able to better assess its chances of success. 10 The additional information may eventually lead the …rm to decide not to invest in the project. This may make waiting bene…cial because it can potentially help avoid the …nancial losses associated with the development of an unsuccessful product. On the other hand, in our model, earlier investors end up releasing the product earlier, and thus enjoy a natural …rst-mover advantage. 11 These two features of the model induce a trade-o¤ in the …rm's problem between investing early to enjoy the …rst-mover advantage, and waiting to acquire new information and reduce the risk of investment. Mans…eld(1968b, p. 105 ) emphasizes this trade-o¤ in the …rm's decision making process. As he states, on the one hand, "there are often considerable advantages in waiting, since improvements occur in the new product and process and more information becomes available regarding its performance and market". On the other, "there are disadvantages... in waiting, perhaps the most important being that a competitor may beat the …rm to the punch...". He concludes: "if the expected returns... justify the risks and if the disadvantages of waiting outweigh the advantages, the …rm should innovate. Otherwise it should wait. Pioneering is a risky business; whether it pays o¤ is often a matter of timing". Now clearly, the presence of this trade-o¤ suggests 8 To illustrate this breakdown of the development process, Kotler and Armstrong (2005) quote a management consultant as saying, "For every 1000 ideas, only 100 will have enough commercial promise to merit a small-scale experiment, only 10 of those will warrant substantial …nancial commitment, and of those only a couple will turn out to be unquali…ed successes". 9 Mans…eld et al. (1977, p. 9) found that the probability that an R&D project would result in an economically successful product or process was only about 0.12; the average probability of technical completion for a project was estimated to be 0.57.
1 0 This information can be technological, in the form of test results, or knowledge about the technological trend for the complementary products. For instance, the potential developers of a new hybrid car may have had an incentive to wait, so that more e¢ cient electric batteries would be produced. Second, this new information could also be commercial in the form of marketing research. For instance, the same hybrid car manufacturer may have waited to study whether and how many consumers would be willing to compromise and accept the relatively weaker performance of this new product. Third, the information may come in the form of knowledge about the overall economic environment. For instance, hybrid cars were only moderately, if at all, successful until just a few years ago, but they are in relatively high demand now. 1 1 For instance, while there are plenty of hybrid models that have been launched recently, the earlier investors, Toyota and Honda, have a clear technological and commercial advantage in that market. As Porter (1990) states: "early movers gain advantages such as being …rst to reap economies of scale, reducing costs through cumulative learning, establishing brand names and customer relationships without direct competition, getting their pick of best sources of raw materials and other inputs... The innovation itself may be copied but the other competitive advantages often remain". See Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) for a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the …rst-mover advantage in innovation.
that, generically, …rms will neither invest immediately in all inventions nor wait until all uncertainty is removed. However, it is not immediately clear how …rms adjust their innovative activity in response to a change in competition. Moreover, it is not a priori obvious whether this adjustment is monotonic as most other theoretical papers concluded or non-monotonic as the newest empirical evidence suggests. Studying how …rms make these adjustments is the main objective of the paper.
A more innovative industry is de…ned to be one in which …rms allocate a larger budget to the innovative activity. 12 There are two channels for a …rm to increase its innovative expenditures. First, the …rm can invest earlier in any given project, thus undertaking riskier projects. 13 Given a constant ‡ow of ideas, this leads to more inventions reaching the innovation stage where the substantial …nancial commitment to the project is made. Second, the …rm may decide to invest in an increasing fraction of the projects that attain a certain probability of success. An increase in this fraction leads to an increase in the level of innovative activity. We will show that for low levels of competition, …rms invest in any project that attains a likelihood of success higher than a certain threshold. For these low values, as competition increases, the threshold decreases and thus …rms undertake riskier projects and become more innovative. On the other hand, for high levels of competition, …rms react to an increase in competition by investing in a decreasing fraction of the projects that reach a given threshold, thus being less innovative. This suggests that when the pre-innovation level of competition is high, the competition in the post-innovation markets is endogenous. More precisely, as competition increases, the fraction of …rms that undertake any speci…c project decreases, lowering the post-innovation level of competition. From a policy perspective, this …nding implies that the positive welfare e¤ects of increasing competition have only a limited scope. Finally, we show that for high values of competition, if the technological spread in the industry increases when competition increases, …rms also respond by investing in safer projects; this further decreases the level of the innovative activity.
The key driving force in our model is the e¤ect of an increase in product market competition on the marginal cost of waiting for more information. For low levels of competition, …rms expect positive pro…ts from innovation and invest in all projects that are su¢ ciently safe. They decide on the optimal moment of investment by comparing the marginal bene…t and the marginal cost of waiting for more information. When competition increases, the marginal cost of waiting increases, exceeding the marginal bene…t earlier and thus inducing …rms to invest earlier. On the other 1 2 AGBBH (2005) employ patent count data as a primary measure of innovation, but as a robustness check, they also use R&D expenditures as an alternative measure. The same inverted-U shape relationship emerges. 1 3 From a policy perspective, taking a riskier decision is, on the one hand, decreasing total welfare, because of the expenses incurred on projects that ultimately prove unsuccessful. On the other hand, it also implies that a successful product will be released earlier; this improves welfare by delivering the corresponding bene…ts earlier and by generating other further inventions based on that new product. Basically, …rms in any industry almost always develop a new product that would deliver positive economic pro…ts almost surely, provided that the required …nancial means are available. But if the …rm or industry has waited a long period of time before making the investment, it cannot necessarily be considered innovative. For instance, any major car manufacturer would invest in the development of a hybrid car now, but only a few of them were willing to take that risk 20 years ago.
hand, for the higher values of product market competition, each …rm's expected pro…t from the innovation approaches the competitive outcome and becomes virtually zero. When competition further increases, to continue to break even, …rms need to be less innovative. They do this by investing in a decreasing fraction of projects. While investing later would ensure non negative expected pro…ts, the resulting strategy pro…le would not be an equilibrium. This is because the marginal cost curve would continue to shift up and therefore the trade-o¤ between marginal cost and marginal bene…t of waiting would continue to be solved at earlier times.
The dynamic setting of the model allows studying the case when the increase in competition alters the technological spread in the industry, de…ned as the length of time it takes for all …rms to make the technological breakthrough. In our model, …rms are not informed of the exact moment when other …rms learned of the same invention. 14 The absence of this piece of information and the fact that each …rm's payo¤ depends on the investment decisions of the other …rms in the industry introduces strategic uncertainty in the …rms'decision problems. An increase in technological spread then leads each …rm to assign a higher probability to the event that the innovation has already started in the industry at any given moment. This induces more pessimistic beliefs about the number of …rms who will invest before the next piece of information arrives and thus increases the marginal cost of waiting. As argued above, the upward shift of the marginal cost curve induces …rms to invest earlier for low levels of competition. For high values of competition, the e¤ect of the belief updating is of second order, and is compensated by the …rst order e¤ect of the decrease in the fraction of projects that are undertaken. On net, the marginal cost decreases, which induces …rms to invest later, thus further reducing innovation. Thus, for higher values of competition, when the technological spread increases, …rms invest in a decreasing fraction of projects and wait longer.
In addition to the key comparative static result with respect to the value of product market competition discussed above, the model o¤ers other predictions of interest. First, when the innovation costs increase, …rms react by investing later for all values of competition. Second, an increase in the speed of learning induces …rms to invest in safer projects. Third, the innovation-maximizing level of competition is essentially independent of the cost of innovation. Fourth, the model is successful at supporting additional empirical regularities that ABBGH(2005) observed. Thus, we show that a lower level of technological dispersion in an industry results in an inverted-U shape with a higher peak attained for a lower level of competition. Finally, we also investigate the welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure. A social planner that aims at designing the market structure most conducive to innovation has to take into account the e¤ects of an increase in competition on the post-innovation social welfare, on the …rms'risk taking behavior, on the timing of innovations and on the degree of redundancy in parallel innovations. We …nd conditions that determine the level of competition that optimizes these welfare e¤ects of innovation and argue that, generically, this level is di¤erent than the one that maximizes the industry-wide innovative activity.
A more comprehensive review of the literature is presented in section 2. The model is presented in section 3, while the analytical results, their discussion and a numerical example are presented in section 4. We also discuss in section 4 the welfare e¤ects of innovation and the case of continuous information acquisition. The conclusion is in section 5. Most of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Review of the Literature
Schumpeter (1943) considered innovation to be the main determinant of technological progress and an engine of economic growth and development. Discussing the role of market structure in enhancing innovation, he distinguished between static and dynamic e¢ ciency by arguing, "a competitive market may be a perfectly suitable vehicle for static resource allocation, but the large …rm operating on a concentrated market is the most powerful engine of progress and ... longrun expansion of total output" (Cohen and Levin, 1989, p. 1060) . Motivated by Schumpeter's conjecture, many empirical studies have investigated the role that the …rm's size and the level of product market competition play in in ‡uencing the innovative activity. 15 The …rst of Schumpeter's claims to be extensively tested is that the possession of some ex ante market power is required for …rms to have the means and incentives to engage in signi…cant innovation activity. Supporters of the Schumpeterian view argued that larger …rms have better access to capital, are less risk averse due to diversi…cation and enjoy economies of scale (the returns from innovation are higher when the …rm has a large volume of sales over which to spread the …xed costs of R&D) and economies of scope (large …rms can bene…t from positive spillovers between various research programs) from innovation. On the other hand, the opponents of the theory argued that as the size of the …rm increases, the e¢ ciency in R&D is undermined by the loss of managerial control, while the incentives of individual scientists and engineers become attenuated. Empirical studies by Scherer (1984) , Pavitt (1987), Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) found a positive linear relationship between …rms'sizes and the intensity of the R&D activity, Bound et al. (1984) found evidence contrary to this claim, and Cohen et al. (1987) found no conclusive e¤ect. Second, Schumpeter argued that innovation should increase with ex post market power because less competition increases the rewards that are associated with successful innovations. This argument is in fact the basis of the current patent laws, which provide the expectation of ex-post market power as an incentive to innovate. In this line of research, studies such as Fellner (1951), Arrow (1962) , Bozeman and Link (1983) have supported Schumpeter's hypothesis, whereas Porter (1990) , Comanor and Scherer (1995) , Geroski (1995) , Baily and Gersbach (1995) and Nickell (1996) rejected it. On the other hand, more recent studies, that allowed for ‡exible non linear relationships, such as Scherer (1967) , Scott (1984) , Levin et al. (1985) and ABBGH (2005) found evidence of the inverted-U relationship between R&D intensity and market concentration. 16 The theoretical literature on this topic is also vast and with mixed results. Earlier papers, such as Loury (1979) , Grossmann and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Caballero and Ja¤e (1993), Martin (1993) sought to con…rm the Schumpeterian hypothesis. 17 On the other hand, inspired by the seminal work of Hart (1983) , more recent theoretical papers focusing on managerial incentives, such as Schmidt (1997), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997) or Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999), proposed models in support of a positive correlation between competition and innovation. 18 The main weakness of this strand of literature is that it hinges on the pro…t maximization assumption at the managerial level being replaced with a less convincing assumption of minimizing innovation costs, subject to the constraint that the …rm does not go bankrupt. 19 Other theoretical papers in support of the positive relationship are Reinganum (1983) , who shows that the existence of a potential entrant induces the incumbent to be more innovative when innovation is uncertain, Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1995), whose approach is close to the one from ABBGH (2005), and Aghion and Howitt (1996) who endogenize the rate at which …rms switch from old technologies to new, and show that an increase in the substitutability between the old and new product lines will induce …rms to adopt the new technologies faster. Boone (2000) obtained conditions under which more competitive pressure induces either more or less innovation to individual …rms depending on their e¢ ciency level. Kamien and Schwartz (1976) are the only other theoretical models to obtain the inverted-U shape relationship. ABBGH (2005) argue that the escaping the competition e¤ect of an increase in innovation in response to an increase in competition is stronger in neckand-neck industries, 20 while the opposite Schumpeterian e¤ect is stronger in less neck-and-neck industries. The inverted-U shape curve emerges because the fraction of neck-and-neck industries in the economy changes in response to a change in competition. As explained in the introduction, this result hinges on the extensive de…nition of innovation that is employed. Kamien and Schwartz (1976) present a model of innovation under rivalry in which …rms decide on the optimal moment to innovate while facing the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, spending more time on developing a product induces an decreased and convex cost of innovation. On the other, it increases the risk that some rival …rm would innovate …rst. As in our model, …rms adjust their innovation behavior in a manner consistent with the inverted-U shape relationship between competition and 1 6 When ABBGH(2005) imposed a linear relationship in their regression analysis, the results were consistent with the ones from the earlier empirical literature, which had yielded a positive slope. This suggests a possible explanation for the previous spurious conclusions. 1 7 See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a detalied overview of this literature. 1 8 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Boone (2000) for excellent reviews of this literature. 1 9 These innovation costs are seen to increase the manager's e¤ort in adapting to the new technology. 2 0 Neck-and-neck industries are de…ned as industries in which …rms are at technological par.
ABBGH (2005) and
innovation. However, there are a number of shortcomings in the model of this paper. First, the measure of rivalry that Kamien and Schwartz use, the expected time of innovation by the other …rm, leaves aside other interesting cases -for instance, the case in which an increase in competition is associated with a decrease in post-innovation pro…ts. Second, and more importantly, the model ignores potential strategic considerations. While the …rm under consideration changes its behavior by investing earlier or later as a response to the rival's expected time of innovation, the rival does not do so.
At a formal level, our paper is also related to the very broad literature on timing of irreversible actions under uncertainty. Closer to our study, Jensen (1982) presents a model of information acquisition in which the incentive to innovate earlier is provided by the discounting of future revenues rather than the competitive pressure. Chamley and Gale (2005) study a model of endogenous information acquisition in which …rms learn about the pro…tability of a common value investment from the actions of the other players, while Decamps and Mariotti (2004) allow in addition for a private value component of the investment and for exogenous information. Caplin and Leahy (1993) develop a model in which investors learn of the pro…tability of new industries from the success of the earlier entrants. Unlike these papers, in our model information is purely exogenous, but the incentive to invest early is determined endogenously. Finally, the experimentation literature (see Bolton and Harris (1999) or Cripps, Keller and Rady (2005)) studies the trade-o¤ between current output and information that can help increase output in the future. In a di¤erent direction, our paper shares the …rst-mover advantage in innovation feature with the patent-race literature (see for instance the seminal paper by Reinganum (1982) ). 21 What distinguishes the current model from this literature is mainly the source of uncertainty. In the patent race literature, the uncertainty was generated by the fact that the technological advancements were the outcome of a random process, or by the fact that the …nish line was random. In contrast, in our model, the uncertainty stems from the fact that the …rm does not know whether the project is successful or not; in other words, it does not know the state of the world.
The Model

The Technology
There is a continuum of identical and risk-neutral …rms who, sequentially, learn of an invention at moments denoted by t i for …rm i. A mass a of …rms becomes aware at each instant t, with t 2 [t 0 ; t 0 + ], > 1 and > 0. 22 The moment t 0 is not known by any of the …rms, but it has a prior distribution, which is common knowledge among the …rms in the industry. This prior distribution is uniform on the real line. 23 After the …rm learns of the new idea, it may invest in its development at any time with a one-time sunk …xed cost c of innovating. 24 As we argue later, a can be interpreted as a counterpart of the Lerner index, that is, an inverse measure of the ability of the …rms in an industry to collude. On the other hand, , the length of the so-called awareness window, constitutes a measure of the technological spread in the industry.
The timeline corresponding to the case in which the …rm i waits time units before investing, is presented in the Figure 2 .
The information acquisition is modelled as follows. 25 Before moment t i , the …rm's R&D department engages in applied research aimed at gaining knowledge with the purpose of using that knowledge for commercial purposes. 26 At moment t i , when …rm i becomes aware of an invention, it has a belief p 0 about the chance of the investment project being ultimately successful. 27 Then, 2 3 We use this nonstandard distribution to avoid boundary e¤ects. As an alternative to using it we may discard the assumption of the existence of a common prior. Thus, instead of having the posterior beliefs of the …rms about t0 at the initial moment when they become aware of the invention be derived from a common prior about t0, we may consider directly that these beliefs are actually the …rm's prior on t0 at that moment. 2 4 It is straightforward to see that the cost c can be interpreted in the rest of the model as the expected present value of all future expenditures on the development of this new product, without changing the qualitative results. Thus, the speci…cation of a one time cost is inessential. Also, to simplify the analysis, we assumed that the research phase is costless; this assumption can be easily dropped, but all the salient results remain the same. 2 5 Since the necessary tests should be identical for all …rms, it is natural to have all …rms go through the same information acquisition process. This can be slightly relaxed to have each …rm i believe that the rest of the …rms go through the same information acquisition process as the process that …rm i goes through. 2 6 Note here that, before becoming aware of the invention, the …rm is completely unaware of the model as a whole. In other words, only at the exact instant when the …rm learns about the new idea, does the …rm also learn about the model as presented here. This is intuitive in that it makes sense for a …rm to not hold beliefs about the characteristics of an object of which it is unaware. Moreover, this unawareness assumption can be discarded if we interpret the notion of "becoming aware" as discovering the product. For instance, all …rms in an industry might be looking for a cure for some disease and have the same common prior about the model as described above. However, only those that discover a potential cure for that disease contemplate an investment decision. This interpretation allows for a common prior of the model, while still preserving the sequential awareness assumption. 2 7 Mans…eld (1968a, ch.3) presents in detail the process by which R&D proposals and budgets were generated and evaluated within the central research laboratory of a major electronic, electrical equipment and appliance manufac-after every units of time, the …rm performs a test against some of the potential technological or commercial problems that the project might encounter. In the state of the world in which the project is successful, the tests are always passed. If the project is unsuccessful, some tests may still be passed. 28 Slightly more formally, if the project is successful, the signal received is always 'Pass'. If the project is unsuccessful, the signal may be either 'Pass' or 'Fail'. Since the focus of our paper is to study the e¤ects of an increase in competition on the …rm's decision making, and in particular on the marginal cost of waiting for more information, we will simplify the analysis by assuming that marginal bene…t of a new informative signal is constant in time. This translates into assuming that the unconditional probability of a 'Pass'signal to be received at moment t i +t, where t 2 Z + f ; 2 ; 3 ; :::; t M g, is e < 1. At the time t M min ft 2 Z + : t ln p 0 g, which is the …rst moment when the posterior probability that the project is successful is no lower than e , the …rm receives a "Pass" signal if and only if the project is successful. Thus, at t M + if all tests have been passed, the …rm knows for sure that the project is successful. In Appendix A4, we present the speci…c sequence of conditional probabilities that generate this signal structure in a manner consistent with Bayesian updating.
There are three salient features in our model. The …rst is that …rms are not informed of the exact moment when other …rms became aware of the same invention. This assumption has three merits. First, it captures the real world uncertainty that …rms face. Second, it e¤ectively induces a smooth marginal cost of waiting and thus a smooth payo¤ function essential for equilibrium existence. Finally, it helps obtaining the inverted-U shape when the increase in competition is associated with an increase in the technological spread in the industry. The second feature is that of a discrete information acquisition. Besides being more descriptive of how information arrives in reality, this discreteness helps deliver the main results of the paper together with the strategic uncertainty assumption. The last salient feature of the model is a single crossing property between the marginal cost of waiting and the marginal bene…t of waiting, as functions of time, in equilibrium. The marginal cost of waiting for more information is naturally increasing over time since, in expectation, the marginal loss from a late release is higher when the product is closer to being a success than when the product is just in an early stage of testing. On the other hand, the speci…c signal structure de…ned above is chosen precisely because it implies a marginal bene…t of waiting that is constant in time, which immediately ensures the single crossing property. The constant marginal bene…t and the rest of the functional forms make the analysis of our discrete dynamic model tractable, and allow for a closed form solution and thus for potential further applications. However, by following the intuitive arguments o¤ered for the main results of the paper, it will be clear that these results turer. The three dimensions on which projects were evaluated were: (1) probabilities of commercial and technical success; (2) additional pro…t generated; (3) cost of innovation. Each proposed project was assigned precise estimations for each of these variables at di¤erent levels of management. This anectdotal evidence underlies the importance that measurable risk of investment plays in the innovative decision-making process at …rm level. 2 8 This signal structure is clearly restrictive in some respects: we do not allow for negative signals that lower the belief in the success of the project, but do not completely eliminate that possibility. Yet, the model is su¢ ciently general and versatile to be able to capture many dynamic investment problems that …rms are likely to face in reality.
hold for more general speci…cations that imply the single crossing property.
The Payo¤s
At moment t i + t, if …rm i invests in a project which will ultimately turn out to be successful, its post-innovation pro…ts are given by: 29
where m(tjt i ; t 0 ) is the measure of …rms that innovate before …rm i and n(tjt i ; t 0 ) is the measure of …rms that innovate at the same time as …rm i. To isolate the e¤ect of the competitive pressure in inducing …rms to invest earlier, we assume no intertemporal discounting. The functional form in (1) can be seen as a reduced form of a model in which …rms that invest in innovation earlier have a higher chance of releasing the product earlier and thus of enjoying the …rst mover advantage. Alternatively, one may think of the functional form as a reduced form for a patent race model in which …rms that invest earlier have a higher chance of winning. 30 The motivation for the particular e¤ect of n(tjt i ; t 0 ) on (t; t i ; t 0 ) is a natural rationing rule in which, if a mass of …rms innovate at the same time, each of these …rms is considered to have a median rank in the group. The functional form in (1) ensures that the total amount of pro…ts available from a successful innovation across the industry does not depend on the particular distribution of the moments when …rms in the industry innovate. We state this fact formally in the following Remark. For an arbitrary distribution of innovation times in the industry, denote by G(t) the measure of …rms who have invested by time t.
Remark 1
The total amount of pro…ts earned in the industry is independent of the distribution G( ).
Proof. See Appendix A1. 2 9 Note that t does not represent a calendar time, as t0 or ti represent, but it is the length of time passed since the …rm became aware of the innovation. The conditioning on t0 is required because this determines the measure of …rms who became aware of the innovation before t + ti.
3 0 One could make the post innovation pro…ts depend also on the measure of …rms that invest after …rm i. In that case a su¢ cient statistic for the …rm i's pro…ts would be the pair ( ; i), where is the total measure of …rms that stay in the post innovation market and i 2 [0; ] is the rank of …rm i. In this case, in a second stage of the game that would follow all investment decisions and full information revelation, the laggard …rms that would experience negative post innovation pro…ts would exit the market. The only o¤ equilibrium path actions would be for some …rms incuring negative pro…ts to stay in the market and for some …rms making positive pro…ts to exit it. Standard backward induction arguments reveal these possible devitations to be inconsequential for the …rst stage. Thus, in the …rst stage of the game, which is the model we are analyzing in this paper, all …rms would know . To avoid uninteresting complications, we specify the post innovation pro…ts only as a function of the rank i as in (1).
We will consider throughout the paper that c is high enough so that if all …rms released the product before …rm i, then, even if the project succeeds, …rm i makes negative pro…ts, i.e.
This condition eliminates the uninteresting case in which …rms wait so long that they eventually invest in innovation under almost certainty. In the real world, laggard …rms frequently choose not to invest in innovation, and instead they either purchase the license for the new product, wait for the patent to expire, or copy the new technology through reverse engineering if it is not protected.
The Measure of Competition
Competition has been modeled in the literature in several ways. 31 Boone (2008) shows that the salient feature common to all theoretical parametrizations of competition is that an increase in competition always raises the relative pro…t shares of the more advanced …rms and reduces the pro…ts of the least advanced …rms active in the industry. We show in Appendix A2 that in our model these conditions are satis…ed when the increase in competition is parametrized by an increase in a, an increase in , or an increase in a . 32 Moreover, both an increase in a and an increase in lower the total amount of pro…ts made by all the …rms in the industry.
A higher value of a means that the product market competition increases while the length of the awareness window remains …xed. We de…ne the technological spread in an industry to be the length of time it takes for all …rms to learn of the innovation. Thus, an increase in a is associated with an increase in competition that does not change the technological spread in the industry. On the other hand, an increase in parametrizes an increase in competition that also increases the technological spread. For instance, if the number of …rms in the industry increases, one would expect that it takes longer for all of them to discover a solution to a certain problem. In fact, using the total factor productivity as a proxy for the technological level of a …rm and the price-cost margin to measure competition, ABBGH (2005) show empirically that the average technological gap in an industry increases with competition. 33 In our paper, we will focus the discussion on the 3 1 For instance, papers such as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or Martin (1993) identify an increase in competition with an increase in the number of active …rms in the industry. On the other hand, ABBGH(2005), Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) identify it with a more agressive interaction among …rms and thus with decrease in the …rms'rents. Finally, Vives (1999, chap 6) presents conditions under which Bertrand equilibria are more competitive than Cournot equilibria. 3 2 To understand this, assume that there are m …rms in the industry and that starting at t0 …rms become aware of the invention at constant rate a. Then, if …rms become aware independently of each other, the resulting arrival process is distributed P oisson(a), while, conditional on t0, the time T m when the m th …rm becomes aware is distributed Gamma(m; a). In particular, the expected time for the m th …rm to learn of the invention is E(
. In other words, the total number of …rms in the industry can be written as m = aE(T m ). Thus, an increase in the number of …rms can be parametrized either by an increase in a or an increase in E(T m ) or an increase in aE(T m ). For tractability reasons, in our model, conditional on t0, the time T m is deterministic and takes value . 3 3 Clearly, by parametrizing an increase in competition with an increase in a coupled with a decrease in , one two polar cases when the competition is measured by a or . To simplify exposition, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by x the parameter that measures the value of competition, and we will specify precisely which case we consider only when the distinction is meaningful.
As a side point here, note that while in the above the parameter a was interpreted as the mass of …rms in the industry that learn of the invention at any particular time, it can also be interpreted simply as the inverse measure of the degree to which the …rms in the industry are able to collude. 34 Therefore, our model can also be used, for instance, to describe a duopoly, in which an increase in a is associated with a decrease in the ability of the two …rms to collude. Since each candidate parameter for measuring competition in our model can be interpreted in a variety of ways, depending on how competition is measured in a particular application, we remain agnostic with respect to exactly what these parameters mean precisely. This preserves the highest level of generality for our model.
Results
The Equilibrium
The main result of the paper describes the symmetric equilibrium of our model. This equilibrium is completely characterized by the time …rms wait before investing, (x), and by the probability with which …rms pursue the project, (x). As common for other models with mixed-strategy equilibria, (x) can also be interpreted as the fraction of projects into which the …rm invests, and we will sometimes refer to it as such in the rest of the paper. Proposition 2 and its corollaries describe the salient qualitative features of the equilibrium of our model. The proof of these results as well as more precise statements, with the exact conditions determining (x), (x) and the cuto¤ x, can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, there exists a threshold x such that: (i) For x < x, (x) = 1 and …rms expect strictly positive pro…ts from innovation.
(ii) For x > x, (x) < 1 and …rms expect zero pro…ts from innovation.
Corollary 3 When x := a, for a > a, all …rms wait the same amount of time (a) before mixing could study the e¤ects on innovation of an increase in competition that decreases the technological spread.
between investing and not investing. When x := , there exists a sequence 0 = < 1 < 2 < ::: and j 2 f0; 1g such that:
(i) for 2 [ 2k+j ; 2k+j+1 ] …rms wait ( ) before mixing between investing and not investing.
(ii) for 2 [ 2k+j+1 ; 2k+j+2 ], …rms mix among investing after ( ), investing after ( ) + , and not investing at all.
As corollary 3 states, for some values of > all …rms wait the same amount of time ( ) before mixing between investing and not investing, while for the rest of the values of > , …rms mix among three options and thus there are two possible equilibrium waiting times. In Appendix B4 we …nd conditions under which …rms invest as soon as they learn of the invention and conditions under which they invest only in perfectly safe projects. As expected, …rms invest immediately when p 0 is su¢ ciently high, and wait until they remove all uncertainty if the level of competition is su¢ ciently low. 35 The next two results discuss comparative statics. First, we denote by p t the belief of …rm i in the success of the project at t i + t.
Corollary 4 (i) (x) is increasing in c for all levels of competition.
(ii) p (x) is increasing in for all levels of competition.
The proof of this corollary follows immediately from the precise characterization of the equilibrium in Proposition 2. The …rst statement of the corollary suggests that when the innovation costs are higher, …rms wait more before innovating. Put di¤erently, the higher the pro…ts that the innovations promise in case of success, the more risky the projects undertaken. Second, measures the speed of learning. Thus, the corollary states that, all else being equal, when …rms learn faster about the pro…tability of new products, they end up investing in safer projects. The e¤ect on the equilibrium value of waiting time is ambiguous because while an increase in increases the equilibrium value of the belief in the ultimate success of the project, it also increases the speed of learning and thus, that belief level may be attained earlier. To pin down the sign of that e¤ect precisely, one needs to know the values of the rest of the parameters of the model.
The comparative static of interest is the one with respect to the measure of competition. The result is presented in the next corollary.
Corollary 5 For x < x, (x) is decreasing. For x > x, (x) is decreasing, while (x) is constant when x := a, and increasing when x := .
We present …rst the intuition for this corollary for the case when the increase in competition is parametrized by an increase in a. First, for low levels of competition, the post-innovation pro…ts from a successful project are signi…cant, and thus …rms expect strictly positive pro…ts from innovation. Therefore, the optimality condition that drives the …rm's response is the one that solves the trade-o¤ between the marginal cost (henceforth, denoted M C) and marginal bene…t (M B) of waiting for an additional informative signal. The M C of waiting for …rm i is the expected decrease in post-innovation rents due to the expected loss in …rst mover advantage. 36 On the other hand, the M B is the additional information provided by the signal; in monetary terms, the M B can be measured as the expected forgone costs on an unsuccessful project. As explained in Section 3.1, the M C and M B curves satisfy a single crossing property.
An increase in a shifts the M C curve upwards, while the M B curve is una¤ected. Therefore, for small values of a, as a increases, …rms respond by waiting less in equilibrium. In the literature, this is called the "escaping the competition e¤ect". Above a certain level of competition, a, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. If all …rms that became aware of the new product before some …rm i, have already invested at the …rst moment when the M C of waiting exceeds the M B for …rm i, then the expected measure of …rms who would release the product before …rm i would be too high for …rm i to expect non-negative pro…ts from investing in the project. Conversely, if …rms were to just respond to the increase in competition by investing later, then each …rm would have an incentive to deviate and invest earlier. Thus, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, in which all …rms invest in the project, is sustainable.
Instead, for a > a …rms mix between innovating and not innovating, thus e¤ectively investing in only a fraction of the projects. Therefore, they respond to increased competition by being less innovative. In line with the Schumpeterian argument, the explanation is that in highly competitive industries, the potential revenues from a successful new product are divided among many …rms and thus each …rm's expected pro…t from the innovation is virtually zero. When the technological spread does not change, …rms reduce their level of innovative activity by investing with a decreasing probability (a) 2 (0; 1). This endogenizes the level of competition in the post-innovation markets and allows …rms to expect nonnegative pro…ts. Note that if (a) did not decrease, but instead …rms would continue to invest later, the M C curve would continue to shift up as a increases. Thus, the trade-o¤ between the M C and M B of waiting, which determines the moment when the expected pro…ts from innovation are at their highest level, would continue to be solved earlier. But these maximum pro…ts would be negative. Thus, (a) needs indeed to decrease when a increases.
To understand the intuition for Corollary 5 in the case when the increase in competition also increases the technological spread in the industry, we …rst provide intuition for why the M C of waiting increases when increases, and discuss the elasticity of the MC curve with respect to . We do these for the simplest case in which all …rms wait for periods before investing and restrict attention to the case when t < . Thus, note …rst that at t i …rm i's posterior of t 0 , F 0 ( ) is uniform on [t i ; t i ]. Second, conditional on any t 0 , …rm i will know that, according to the equilibrium strategies of the other …rms, the measure of …rms who have already invested at any moment t i + t is m(tjt i ; t 0 ; ; x) a min( ; max(t i + t t 0 ; 0))
Note that innovation has already started at moment t i + t, that is, m(tjt i ; t 0 ; ; x) > 0 if and only if t 0 2 [t i ; t i ( t)]. Then, the expected measure of …rms who have invested at t i + t is
It follows that
; this is precisely the measure of the set of values of t 0 for which innovation has already started in the industry at moment t i + t. Thus, waiting for additional t time units increases the expected measure of …rms who have invested by a t multiplied by the probability that innovation has started in the industry. Straightforward calculations show that @ 2 @ @t (tjt i ; ; ) > 0. It follows that the instant M C of waiting at t i + t, M C(t; ) = p t @ @t (tjt i ; ; ) is increasing in . This is because an increase in technological spread induceseach …rm to hold more pessimistic beliefs about the moment when other …rms started learning of the innovation. To understand this, note …rst that from the view point of …rm i, the earliest moment that innovation could have started is t i + , and second that and t are …xed. Therefore, when increases, …rm i assigns a higher probability at moment t i + t to the event that innovation has already started. 37 This makes waiting more costly. Finally,
], so the M C curve is inelastic with respect to , for t close to . Intuitively, when t is close to , …rm i already assigns a high probability that innovation has started, so an increase in the technological spread does not alter the beliefs signi…cantly. For later use, note also that the M C curve becomes almost perfectly inelastic at as ! 0. A somewhat similar argument shows that when t , M C(t; ) is again increasing in and inelastic with respect to for t 2 [ ; + 2 ]. Since for t , the event that some …rms have started investing has probability one, the main di¤erence is that an increase in increases the measure of the set of values of t 0 for which all …rms have already invested. Now, for < , as argued above, when increases the M C increases and …rms invest earlier. Above , where the expected pro…ts become zero, if …rms were to just wait longer as increases, without a corresponding decrease in ( ), the M C curve would continue to shift up. This would lead …rms to solve the trade-o¤ earlier and incur negative pro…ts. Thus ( ) must decrease. More precisely, ( ) must decrease so that the expected pro…ts in equilibrium, p ( ) 1 1 2 a ( ) stay at zero, as necessary for the …rms to be willing to randomize. As shown above, in equilibrium, the M C curve is inelastic with respect to around . On the other hand, the M C curve is unit elastic with respect to . 38 This is because the decrease in ( ) decreases the density of …rms who invest at any particular moment; therefore the total measure of …rms who invest in any time period decreases by exactly the same fraction that ( ) decreases. Since the magnitudes of the percentage changes in ( ) and must be equal to keep expected pro…ts at zero, the e¤ect of the decrease in ( ) dominates around and thus lowers the marginal cost. On the other hand, since the M C is increasing in time, the only relevant section of the M C curve for determining the new equilibrium waiting time is the middle segment around . Since the curve shifts down on this part, …rms end up investing later.
Note the distinct channels through which the two parameters a and increase the M C of waiting. An increase in a increases the expected measure of …rms who invest in the time it takes to acquire a new signal or increase the potential loss in post-innovation pro…ts from being beaten to the punch by another …rm. 39 On the other hand, an increase in alters the beliefs that …rms have regarding the event that innovation has already started in the industry. This underlies the role that uncertainty plays in delivering the results of the model. Absent uncertainty, the M C does not increase when increases; the M C of waiting would be either a or 0 depending on whether innovation has started or not in the industry. This would imply, for instance, that …rms do not respond by investing earlier for low values of competition. 40 3 8 As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the M C of waiting for one more signal is pt (x)a 1 1 2 . The unit elasticity is an artifact of the linearity of pro…ts in (1) . A more general su¢ cient condition for this argument to go through is that the M C is elastic with respect to a. This is equivalent to the M C being convex in a and with in (1) being concave and decreasing in m(tjti; t0) + 1 2 n(tjti; t0). A concave speci…cation of allows for a less steep fall in pro…ts for the earliest innovators. This is consistent with the presence of some further uncertainty regarding the time of release which smooths the expected payo¤s and thus weakens the …rst mover advantage in innovation. 3 9 To understand this, assume a simple setup in which, if the project is successful, the …rst …rm investing in the product has a payo¤ of 1 and all the others have a payo¤ of x. Then, conditional on the product being ultimately successful and on no other …rm having already invested, the expected loss in post innovation rents from waiting for one more piece of information is 1 x multiplied by the probability p that some other …rm invests in the product in that period. Clearly, if an increase in competition is associated with an increase in the number of …rms in the industry, then p should increase when the number of …rms in the industry increases. On the other hand, if the increase in competition a¤ects the post innovation pro…ts, then following Boone (2008) , the increase in competiton should decrease x. In both cases, the conditional M C, which is p (1 x) increases.
4 0 As a side point, note that …rms invest earlier for high values of competition if the increase in competition is associated with a lower level of technological spread in the industry. To see this, consider an increase in a coupled with a decrease in that increases the value of a . To keep (a; )a constant as required by the zero pro…t condition, a (a; ) must increase by the same fraction that decreases. Since M C ( ; ) is more elastic with respect to a (a; ) than with , this would make M C ( ; ) shift up and thus it would induce …rms to continue investing earlier even
A Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate the above theoretical results with a numerical example. We calibrated the model with the following values of the parameters: c = 0:3, = 0:4, = 0:2. To also describe the timing of innovation for the higher values of competition, we allowed for the technological spread increases with competition and considered = 100a. The following …gure presents the results of Proposition 2 by plotting the range of possible values for the equilibrium value of 1 p against the total measure of competition a , as the level of competition increases. Note that 1 p measures the risk that …rms undertake, and thus it is a measure of the innovation intensity in the industry. The step function from Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium values of 1 p .
For any given value of competition, …rms stop waiting for additional information if two conditions are satis…ed. First, their belief in the feasibility of the project should be high enough that they expect non-negative pro…ts from that investment. When all …rms invest in the project, for any amount of time t spent on acquiring additional information, this condition is satis…ed whenever 1 p t is below the curve h in Figure 3 . Second, the M C of waiting for one more piece of information should exceed the M B of waiting for that information. In Figure 3 , this is the case whenever 1 p t is below the curve f 2 . Since the M C is increasing in time, it is su¢ cient to impose this condition at , so 1 p should fall below the curve f 2 .
On the other hand, …rms need to postpone investing in innovation for periods, which can only happen if their belief in the feasibility of the project is low enough. More precisely, if 1 p t were below f 2 and below h, for some t < , …rms would deviate from the equilibrium strategy and after they make zero pro…ts. In this case the additional risk undertaken would be compensated by a lower level of competition in the post innovation market. invest earlier. Since the M C is increasing in time, a su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium to be sustainable is that …rms have an incentive to wait at . In Figure 3 this is the case whenever 1 p is above f 2 . Now, f 1 is de…ned such that whenever 1 p is above f 2 , 1 p is above the curve f 1 . Therefore, in order for all …rms to wait for no more or less than time units, 1 p should fall in the area between the curves h, f 1 and f 2 . Therefore, for low levels of competition the bounds that drive the equilibrium value of 1 p are f 1 and f 2 , which as Corollary 5 also shows are both increasing in competition. Thus, for small values of the competitive fringe, …rms react to an increase in competition by being more innovative.
The 41 The motivation for this fact is rather involved and its presentation is deferred to the Appendix. As stated in Corollary 3, for those values of competition, …rms mix among three options and thus there exist two di¤erent possible values of the equilibrium belief. It is possible that when competition increases above the highest level that allows for a pure strategy equilibrium, …rms mix among three options rather than two as in Figure 3 . Graphically, this occurs if the curve h does not intersect at the peak a horizontal hashed line representing a value of 1 p , but instead intersects one of the vertical hashed lines. Figure 3 con…rms the fact that for these higher values of competition, …rms react in equilibrium by being less innovative when the competition in the industry increases.
The Innovation-Maximizing Level of Competition
To provide some additional testable implications of our model, we examine the behavior of the peak of the inverted-U shape curve. More precisely, we …rst investigate the e¤ect of a change in the cost of innovation on the values of competition that maximize the innovation in the industry and on the corresponding equilibrium risk of innovation. Second, we argue that our model supports theoretically two additional empirical facts uncovered by ABBGH(2005). These facts describe the behavior of the peak of the curve in response to a change in the average technological gap in the industry. For uniformity of exposition, we de…ne the set of innovation-maximizing levels of competition to be the set of values of competition that induce the pure strategy equilibrium with the shortest waiting time. An inspection of Figure 3 reveals that due to the discrete information acquisition process, there exists a range of values of x that maximize innovation. In particular, in Figure 3 , these values are in between the levels of competition corresponding to the intersections 4 1 The possible levels for 1 p can be inferred in the …gure from the values that the step function takes below a . of the highest horizontal line 1 p with the curves f 2 and h. However, as mentioned at the end of section 4.2, if the curve h intersects a vertical hashed line at the peak, the upper bound of this set is instead determined by the intersection of 1 p with the curve f 1 .
To understand the conditions that determine this set of values, note …rst that as stated in section 4.2, the M C of waiting at is higher than the M B of waiting at when 1 p is below the curve f 2 , and is equal precisely when the two curves intersect. So the lower bound of the interval, denoted by x 0 is determined by the conditon that the M C and the M B of waiting at t i + are equal at the lowest possible equilibrium value of p . Denoting by S the event that the project is successful and by F the event that the signal received is "Fail", the M B of waiting is: c Pr(F jS) Pr(S). Since Pr(F jS) = 0, it follows that the M B of waiting is c Pr (F ). On the other hand, assuming that all other …rms invest after waiting for time units, the M C of waiting at moment t i + t for …rm i is the (expected) pro…t at moment t i + t, p t [1 (tjt i ; ; x)], minus the expected value as of moment t i + t of the (expected) pro…ts at moment t i + t + . This second value is p t+ [1 (t + jt i ; ; x)] Pr F + 0 Pr (F ). Since p t = p t+ Pr F , it follows then immediately that the M C at t i + t equals p t [ (t + jt i ; ; x) (tjt i ; ; x)]. We have then that x 0 is determined by:
The upper bound of the interval, denoted by x, is determined by one of the following two conditions. If the bound is at the intersection of h and 1 p , then the condition is that …rms expect precisely zero pro…ts from innovation for that value of p while they all invest. Using the notation introduced in (4), we can write this condition as 42
On the other hand, if the upper bound is instead at the intersection of f 1 and 1 p , the condition is that the M C and the M B of waiting at t i + are equal at the lowest possible equilibrium value of p . Using the same reasoning as above, it can be argued that the corresponding equation is:
For any value of the parameter of interest, equations (5), (6) and (7) determine the two bounds x 0 ( ) and x ( ) = minfx 1 ( ) ; x 2 ( )g. (ii) as c increases on (c k 1 ; c k ], x 0 (c) increases continuously from x L to x M , while x(c) …rst increases continuously from x M to x H and then decreases continuously from x H to x M ; (iii) (x) = k for all x 0 (c) x x(c) and c 2 (c k 1 ; c k ].
Proof. See Appendix C1.
The upper bound increases when driven by f 1 and decreases when driven by h. To understand the result, note that since (x 0 (c)) = (x(c)), by substituting p (x 0 (c)) from (6) into (5), it follows that the M C and M B curves at the peak of the inverted-U curve are proportional to the cost of innovation c. Thus the adjustments of the M C and M B curves have the same amplitude at the peak. Therefore, the set of values of competition that make the values of the M C and M B approximately equal at the peak is the roughly the same for all values of c. This is precisely what Proposition 6 suggests. In the limit, as ! 0, the interval collapses to a single point and the maximizing level of competition is the same for all values of c. 43 Therefore, a change in the cost of innovation does not have a meaningful e¤ect on the level of competition that maximizes innovation. Finally, (iii) states that as the cost of innovation increases, the minimum possible equilibrium waiting time increases. This is natural since at the peak of the inverted-U curve, …rms make almost zero expected pro…ts so when the cost of innovation is higher, …rms need to invest in safer projects to ensure non-negative pro…ts.
Comparative statics with respect to the average technological gap. ABBGH(2005) also study the relationship between the properties of the peak of the inverted-U shape curve and the degree of what ABBGH(2005) call the "neck-and-neckness" of an industry. The measure of the degree of neck-and-neckness in an industry that ABBGH(2005) use is the inverse of the average technological gap between the …rms in an industry and the technological leader of that industry. 44 Using as a proxy for the technological gap between two …rms the time between the moments when the …rms make a certain technological breakthrough, that is, between the moments when the …rms learn of the new invention, the average technological gap in our model is
So is also a measure of the average technological gap. In the empirical part of the paper, ABBGH(2005) show in Figure III that for the subsample of industries with a higher degree of neck-and-neckness, the inverted-U curve has a higher peak and attains this peak at a lower level of competition than the curve corresponding to the entire sample of industries. However, while the theoretical model in ABBGH(2005) does support the …rst of these two results, it does not support the second one.
We will show next that our model replicates both of these two additional empirical regularities if our measure of technological gap can be considered as a proxy for the measure that ABBGH(2005) use.
In order to study the comparative statics with respect to the average technological gap, we will vary s , while holding the total level of competition as measured by a constant. This means that when s increases, a will decrease precisely so as to keep a constant. Thus, in the following, will parametrize the level of competition. Holding constant ensures that the change in the technological gap does not induce a change in competition, so that the desired e¤ect is precisely identi…ed. In line with the notation introduced above, 0 (s); (s) will denote the set of values of competition that maximize innovation.
Proposition 7
There exists a sequence s 0 < s 1 < s 2 < ::: such that:
(i) as s increases on (s k 1 ; s k ], 0 (s) and (s) increase continuously in s;
(ii) when s = s k for some k 0, 0 (s) = (s);
Proof. See Appendix C2.
Thus, as s increases, the set of values of competition that maximize innovation essentially moves to the right. On the other hand, the minimum possible pure strategy equilibrium waiting time weakly increases. Conversely, when s decreases, that is, when the average technological gap decreases or the degree of neck-and-neckness increases, the peak of the inverted-U curve will move up and to the left. This is precisely what ABBGH(2005) uncovered empirically. Intuitively, when the average technological gap decreases, each …rm i expects that the moments when the rest of the …rms learned of the same invention are closer to the moment when …rm i learned. In other words, it increases the density of …rms in the awareness window. This increases the M C of waiting for more information at any moment, and therefore induces …rms to invest earlier for any value of competition. Moreover, since at the peak of the inverted-U curve …rms make zero pro…ts, the lower equilibrium belief about the ultimate success of the investment that results from investing earlier must correspond to a value of competition which is also lower.
Welfare Analysis
A frequent critique of the standard models of welfare analysis is that they are rooted in static economic analysis aiming at minimizing the deadweight loss from monopoly while ignoring the dynamic e¤ects of improvements in productivity or of the introducing of new products. A social planner that aims at designing the market structure that generates the welfare maximizing level of innovative activity has to account for a number of e¤ects that a change in product market competition induces. First, in line with the standard model of welfare analysis, an increase in competition lowers the deadweight loss in the post-innovation market. Second, as shown in our paper, the increase in competition changes the time …rms wait before innovating, thus potentially generating the bene…ts from innovation earlier. Third, it induces an adjustment in the …rms' risk taking behavior, thus determining the amount of resources spent on unsuccessful innovations. Finally, it a¤ects the number of …rms that engage into a speci…c line of research, thus potentially inducing a change in the amount of resources exhausted on parallel innovations. A fully ‡edged model of the social planner's problem would have to capture the welfare considerations in the post-innovation market. In particular, it should specify the type of innovation under consideration and it should make a number of assumptions about the welfare bene…ts, in terms of consumer and producer surpluses, that the innovation creates. This analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. However, by employing a reduced form model of the post-innovation market, one can de…ne the social planner's problem so that it captures all the other e¤ects that the market structure has on innovation.
We denote by w(x) the ex post social welfare from a successful innovation as a function of the ex post level of competition. According to the standard models of social welfare, it follows that generically w 0 (x) 0, for x x c where x c corresponds to a perfectly competitive market. For instance, if the innovation results in a new good, x c is the level of competition at which the marginal bene…t for society of one more unit -the market price -equals average cost of producing all units. Thus, at x c , …rms make zero pro…ts in the post-innovation market. Note that since at x, where x is the threshold given by Proposition 2, …rms make zero expected pro…ts taking into account the risk and cost of innovation, it must be that x x c . We assume that the social planner has a discount factor . Finally, to capture the e¤ect of parallel innovations, we assume that the number of …rms in the pre-innovation market is …xed at N , that they all contemplate the idea of innovating, and that one …rm is enough to develop the new product or process as long as the invention is feasible. Then, given the equilibrium values of (x) and (x) derived in the previous analysis, the social planner's problem is to choose x to maximize: 45
For x < x, we showed that (x) = 1, so the social planner's value function reduces to v(x) = 4 5 Note that the probability of innovation is e (x) , that is the probability that the …rst (x) signals are positive.
p 0 w(x)e (x) cN e ( + ) (x) . Abstracting away from discreteness issues, we can write:
Thus, an increase in competition increases the social welfare by increasing the post-innovation welfare (p 0 w 0 (x)e (x) ) and by generating the innovation bene…ts earlier ( 0 (x)p 0 w(x)e (x) ), and it lowers it through expenses incurred on unsuccessful projects (( + ) 0 (x)cN e ( + ) (x) ). Certain conditions would determine an optimal level of competition lower than x, the level that maximizes the innovative activity in the industry. First, this may happen when the industry-wide innovation costs are high relative to the expected bene…ts as measured by w(x). This may happen when either the …rm level innovation cost c or the number of …rms in the industry N is high. Also a lower level of competition is bene…cial when the innovation in the industry under consideration is characterized by an inherent high degree of technological or commercial risk, that is when p 0 is small. On the other hand, more competition is better when the social marginal bene…ts in the post-innovation market, as measured by w 0 (x) are su¢ ciently high, or when the speed of learning is high -in this last case, the society bene…ts from the additional time spent on acquiring new information.
On the other hand, when x > x, we have 0 (x) < 0 and 0 (x) 0. On the other hand, as argued in section 4.1, for x > x, we have (x)x = x. Thus,
First, when x = , as we showed, 0 ( ) > 0 so the increase in competition induces a later ( 0 (x)p 0 w(x)e (x) 1 (1 (x)) N ), but safer (( + ) (x) 0 (x)cN e ( + ) (x) ) innovation. Second, the increase in competition decreases the probability that each …rm would pursue that particular line of research. On the one hand, this has the negative e¤ect that it lowers the chance that the innovation would be completed in the industry (N 0 (x)p 0 w(x)e (x) (1 (x)) N 1 ); on the other, it reduces the redundancies in innovation ( 0 (x)cN e ( + ) (x) ). For values of x close enough to x, 0 (x) ' 0 because achieves its minimum at x, while (1 (x)) N 1 ' 0 because (x) ' 1. Therefore, just above x the only non-negligible e¤ect of an increase in ex ante competition is the decrease in the redundancy e¤ect. Therefore, when the optimal level of competition is not lower than x, it will always be higher. However, note that even when x = a, so that the delay in innovation does not occur, it is never socially optimal to induce too high a level of product market competition. To see this, note that p (a) w(a (a)) p (a) (a (a)) = c, where the …rst inequality comes from the fact that the …rms'pro…ts are included in the social welfare, while the second from the zero pro…t condition. Since 0 (a) = 0, it follows that v 0 (a c ) < 0 and thus the optimal value of competition is lower than a c . Intuitively, if the post-innovation rents were too small, …rms would end up investing in few projects so many otherwise successful lines of innovation would not be pursued.
Multiplicity of Equilibria
As in many dynamic discrete time settings (see Ober…eld and Trachter (2010) for other examples) alternative symmetric equilibria might emerge in our model. In particular, in our case …rms could mix among investing at di¤erent moments. Lemma 19 in Appendix C3 presents necessary conditions for such an equilibrium. In the set-up of our model, these conditions are very restrictive for symmetric equilibria other than the one from Proposition 2, and as illustrated numerically in the appendix, generically, these conditions are not satis…ed. This is because the single crossing property between the M C and M B of waiting induces a concavity of the expected pro…t from innovation in the waiting time which makes it impossible for …rms to be indi¤erent among more than two waiting times. Moreover, the two moments need to be time units apart; otherwise …rms would deviate and invest in between the two moments. But these are precisely the conditions that de…ne the equilibrium of Proposition 2.
The Case of Continuous Information Acquisition
To underscore the relevance of the discreteness of the information acquisition process speci…cation from our model, we also present the main comparative statics with respect to the value of product market competition under the assumption that the information acquisition is continuous. While this is not always the case (see Ober…eld and Trachter (2010) for counterexamples), for this model it is straightforward to show that assuming continuous information acquisition is equivalent to taking the limit ! 0, while the length of the awareness window stays constant.
Proposition 8 When information arrives continuously, in a symmetric equilibrium there exist two thresholds a; such that:
(i) (a) is decreasing in a for a < a and a constant function of a for a > a; (a) is 1 for a < a and is decreasing in a for a > a.
(ii) ( ) is constant in for < and increasing in for > ; ( ) is 1 for < and is decreasing in for > .
Proof. See Appendix C4.
Therefore, while the inverted-U shape curve emerges again when competition is measured by a, it does not fully do so when the increase in competition is associated with an increase in the technological spread in the industry. This is because the value of the M C around the equilibrium waiting time does not increase when the length of the awareness window increases. To understand why, recall from the discussion motivating the results in Corollary 5 that the M C curve is very inelastic in the neighborhood around . In particular, as approaches 0 since according to the equilibrium strategies of the other …rms, innovation has almost surely started at , no measurably meaningful information arrives between and . Thus, an increase in does not change the value of the M C at . A similar argument explains why the M C at does not change. Since M C is increasing in time, these are the only two values of the M C relevant for pinning down the equilibrium strategies. Therefore, …rms do not change their waiting time for the lower levels of competition when increases. 46 For higher values of , as increases, must decrease to satisfy the zero pro…t condition. This decreases the M C and induces …rms to invest later. 47 The results in Proposition 8 underscore the importance of the discrete information acquisition process in this setting.
Conclusion
The issue of innovation is complex and has many facets, some of which have been studied extensively in the industrial organization literature over the past half a century. Our model uncovers two of the main driving forces in ‡uencing the level of innovative activity in an industry. These two forces have not only the merit that they are su¢ cient to generate the empirically documented inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation, but they also o¤er reason to believe that they are indeed some of the major forces that in ‡uence a …rm's innovation decisions. In order to isolate the e¤ect of the trade-o¤ that we focus on, we abstract away from other factors that may play a role in the …rms'decision making process. Clearly, enriching the model to include some of these additional forces would improve the predictive power of the model.
The main policy implication of the results in our paper is that the way a policy maker should stimulate the innovative activity in an industry is not by always decreasing the level of product market competition, as Schumpeter suggested, or by always increasing it, as other economists who looked for a linear relationship concluded. Instead, my paper argues that a more thorough empirical analysis should be performed in order to …nd the right way to use the tool of the market structure design in promoting innovation for each industry under consideration.
A reduced form version of the model in this paper would have the marginal cost of waiting and the marginal bene…t of waiting curves satisfying two conditions. First, they would exhibit the single crossing property. Second, the marginal cost curve would shift up in response to an increase in competition, while the marginal bene…t curve would stay …xed. Then, an increase in competition would decrease the time at which the two curves intersect and thus explain the increase in innovation for the small values of competition. When this equilibrium waiting time is su¢ ciently low, …rms would expect zero pro…ts from innovation and thus a further increase in competition would require …rms to become less innovative. The need for the fully ‡edged model in this paper stems mainly from three considerations. First, the reduced form model does not explain the link between the level of competition, which is a parameter with immediate empirical interpretation, and the marginal cost of waiting, whose interpretation is di¢ cult in the absence of a well de…ned model. This is even more problematic when the increase in competition is associated with an increase in the technological spread rather than an increase in the technological density. Second, the reduced model would not immediately suggest the way in which …rms can become less innovative for higher values of competition. Simply stating that they would invest later is unsatisfactory since the marginal cost of waiting would continue to increase and thus the trade-o¤ would be solved earlier rather than later. The model in this paper allows distinguishing between decreases in innovation that lead to a delay in innovation and decreases in innovation that lead to a decrease in the number of projects undertaken. Finally, the model predicts additional testable regularities that a reduced form model would not uncover. For future work, we intend to test the model in an experimental setting.
Appendix Appendix A1. Proof of Remark 1
Since G is a cumulative distribution function, it is right-continuous and therefore the set of points of discontinuity is countable. Denote this set by S d = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; :::; s jS d j g, where jS d j can be 1, and let s 0 t 0 . Also, for any s 2 S d denote by G(s ) lim t!s G(s), and for any t 2 [t 0 ; 1)nS d denote by g(t) the probability distribution function associated with G. Then, the total amount of pro…ts earned from the innovation in the industry is:
where we used the fact that G(1) = a . Integrating by parts
dt, we obtain:
. Therefore, as claimed = a (1 c)
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The fact that the absolute pro…ts of all but the most advanced …rm in the industry decrease with competition is immediate. On the other hand, by Remark 1, the total pro…ts in the industry are a (1 c) .
Taking derivatives with respect to x, where x is either a or or a , we obtain that:
By (2), 1 a c < 0, so @ @x r( ) > 0 () < 1 c. Therefore, as claimed, the relative pro…t shares of the most advanced …rms increase with an increase in x.
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Since at t i , from the perspective of …rm i, t 0 is distributed uniformly on [t i ; t i ], the expected pro…t of …rm i at t i + t from investing in the innovation is p t [1 (tjt i )] c, where
the expected measure of …rms that invested before and simultaneously to …rm i. We dropped the conditionals on t i , a and which are self evident from the context.
The following results describe the expected measure (tjt i ) for the various strategy pro…les of interest.
Lemma 9 Consider a strategy pro…le under which …rms mix between investing at moments f + 1 ; :::; + n g with probabilities f 1 ; :::; n g, where n 1, 1 = 0, and the sequence f k g Z + is strictly increasing. Denote by 0 max(0; + 1 ) . Then, the expected measure of …rms who have already invested before …rm t i at moment t i + t is the following.
, for t 2 [ + m ; + m+1 ], m 2 f0; :::; ng a , for t + n +
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that the randomization over f + 1 ; :::; + n g is made at the beginning of the game so that at each instant t 2 [t 0 ; t 0 + ], the mass a of …rms who becomes aware at that moment can be distributed among a set of n groups, where group k 2 f1; :::; ng will contain the …rms that will invest at moment + k . Thus, at each instant t 2 [t 0 ; t 0 + ] there is a mass a k of …rms who become aware of the product and invest with probability 1 after exactly + k time units. Denote by k (tjt i ) the expected measure of …rms out of group k that invested before t i + t, from the perspective of …rm t i . Then, we will have:
Firstly, note that due to the sequential awareness assumption and the fact that all …rms wait the same number of time units, n(tjt i ; t 0 ) = 0 for all t. Secondly, according to the strategy pro…le that we are considering, for a …xed value of t 0 and for any t 0, the last …rm out of group k who has invested is the one that became aware at t i +t k , provided that
Consider now an arbitrary group k 2 f1; :::; ng. Note …rstly that for t i + t k < t 0 , no …rm of the group has invested yet while for t i + t k t 0 + all …rms from the group have already invested. Secondly, for the remaining case the measure of …rms out of the group who have invested at t i + t is a k '(tjt i ; t 0 ; ). In conclusion, the measure of …rms who have already invested at t i + t for a …xed value of t 0 is: m k (tjt i ; t 0 ) = a k min( ; max('(t i ; t; ; t 0 ); 0))
If + 1 > , take some t 2 [0; + 1 ), and note that the earliest moment when any …rm could have invested is t i + + 1 . This corresponds to the case when the …rst …rm became aware exactly at t i . But for t 2 [0; + 1 ) we have t i + + 1 > t i + t, so at t i + t the expected measure of …rms who have invested before …rm i is 0. Therefore, (tjt i ) = 0 for t 2 [0; max(0; + 1 )].
Take some moment t 2 [ + m ; + m+1 ], for some m 2 f0; 1; :::; ng. Consider a group k, with k m + 1, so that t
and 0 t k together imply t 0 t i + (t k ), so '(tjt i ; t 0 ; + k ) for any possible value of t 0 , as long as t + k . On the other hand, '(tjt i ; t 0 ; + k ) 0 () t 0 < t i + t k . Therefore, for t 2 [ + m ; + m+1 ) and k m + 1 we have:
Consider now a group k with k m so that t > + k . For any t 0 we have '(tjt i ; t 0 ; + k ) 0 
so over this range of t 0 we have that the measure out of group k is a k . Thus, for t 2 [ + m ; min( + m+1 ; + k + )) and k m we have:
For t + k + , we have k (tjt i ) = a k . It is easy to see that these can be written concisely as we do in the text of the Lemma in (15) .
Then, (16) , (19) and (20) will give the measure as in the text of the Lemma for all t + n + . After t i + + n + , the measure is a for sure.
Corollary 10 (tjt i ) is continuous, strictly increasing on [max(0; + 1 ); + ] and di¤ erentiable with a continuous derivative.
Proof. From (19) and (20), it is clear that k (tjt i ) is continuous and di¤erentiable with a continuous derivative on [0; + ]n S n k=0 f + k ; + k + g. For k 1, we have:
On the other hand,
Therefore, (tjt i ) is continuous with a continuous derivative on [0; + ] as a …nite sum of functions with these properties. (tjt i ) is strictly increasing on [max(0; + 1 ); + ] because 1 (tjt i ) is strictly increasing on this interval, while k (tjt i ) with k 2 are weakly increasing.
Corollary 11 Consider a strategy pro…le under which all …rms wait exactly time units before investing and then invest with probability 1. Then, the expected measure of …rms who have invested before …rm i at moment t i + t is the following.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 9 by taking n = 1 and 1 = 1.
Corollary 12 Consider a strategy pro…le under which each …rm t i mixes between investing and not investing with probability 2 (0; 1) at moment t i + and invests with zero cumulative probability in the rest of the time. Then, the expected measure of …rms who have already invested before …rm t i at moment t i + t is (tjt i ), where (tjt i ) is given by Corollary 11.
Proof. Because in the mixed strategy equilibrium each …rm invests after time units with probability as opposed to probability 1 in the Corollary 11, it is as if the distribution of …rms would be uniform with density a instead of a over a timespan of length and each …rm would invest after time units with probability 1. By replacing a with a as the density in the Corollary 11, we obtain the measure (tjt i ).
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We will show that if conditional on an unsuccessful project, the probability of receiving a 'Pass' signal at t i + t is:
then the resulting unconditional probabilty of receiving a 'Pass'signal is precisely the one de…ned in Section 3.1. Thus, denoting by F t the event of receiving a 'Fail' signal at t i + t and by S the event that the project is successful, we have:
Given the signal structure introduced in Section 3.1, it is straightforward to see that the resulting law of motion for the posterior belief that the project is successful is the following:
, with probability max(e ; p t ) 0, with probability 1 max(e ; p t )
with > 0 and t 2 Z + .
If p t 2 f0; 1g, for some t, then p t 0 = p t for all t 0 t. Clearly, for a …xed p 0 , p t can take values only in the set P (p 0 ; ; ) f0; p 0 ; p 0 e ; p 0 e 2 ; p 0 e 3 ; :::; 1g. Now, if t < t M , (25) becomes Pr F t = e t p 0 e (t ) p 0 1 p 0 e (t ) + p 0 e (t ) = e . On the other hand, at t = t M + , we have e (t M + ) p 0 so Pr
This completes the argument.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2.
We will prove Proposition 2 in three steps. Firstly, in Proposition 13, we will describe the pure strategy equilibria for the low levels of competition. Then, in Proposition 16 we will argue that there is a set of maximal values of competition above which the equilibria in Proposition 13 do not exist. Finally, in Proposition 17 we will describe the equilibria for the higher values of competition.
We start the proof by arguing that we can always restrict attention to action spaces that consist of investment decisions of …rm i at times t i +t, with t 2 [max(0; ); min ( + ; t M + )]\ Z + . Firstly, as we will show in Appendix A3, under any strategy pro…le of interest, (tjt i ) is strictly increasing in t on the interval [max(0; ); + ], where is the minimum amount of time that any of the competing …rms waits before investing according to that strategy pro…le. Thus, in this interval, whenever a …rm's optimal strategy is not to invest as soon as it learns some new information, then the strategy should prescribe the …rm to wait at least more units of time, until it receives the next piece of information. Also, we will show that if > , then (tjt i ) = 0
] so the …rm does not have any incentive to invest before t i + because, up to that moment, the expected pro…t from investing is strictly increasing. This is because the …rm can gather information without risking that other …rms invest it. Finally, the …rm does not have any incentive to wait after t M + because there is no additional information left to acquire. On a separate note, we mention that given the sequential awareness assumption and the fact that, apart from this assumption, all …rms are identical, in the symmetric strategy pro…les that we will consider, no two …rms will invest at the same time. Therefore, n(tjt i ; t 0 ) = 0 for all t.
Denote by M C ; (t) = p t [ (t + jt i ; ; ) (tjt i ; ; )]
to be the M C of waiting at t if all …rms invest at with probability and by M C ; ; + ; + (t) = p t [ (t + jt i ; ; ; + ; + ) (tjt i ; ; ; + ; + )]
the M C of waiting at t if all the other …rms mix among investing at one of the two moments ; + 2 Z + and not investing at all, with probabilities , + and 1 + + respectively.
The marginal bene…t of waiting is de…ned as M B = c(1 e ). We will show that the interpretation of the functional forms in the right hand side of these equations is indeed the one suggested by the name we associate them. We ignore for the time being the constraint that t M + assuming that it does not bind and then in Appendix B4 …nd conditions under which the constraint binds. Also, in Appendix B4, we …nd conditions under which …rms invest as soon as they learn of the invention.
Appendix B1. Proposition 13.
Proposition 13 In a symmetric strategy equilibrium, a necessary and su¢ cient set of conditions for the …rms to wait for 2 Z + before mixing between investing and not investing with probabilities and 1 , respectively, with 2 [0; 1] is that:
(2) p 1 a 2 c 0, with equality when < 1 (30)
Proof. Assume all other …rms invest after time periods and denote by
Since the probability of not receiving a 'Fail'signal in the …rst t periods, with t 2 Z + and t < t M is e t , it follows that (t) = e t [p t (1 (tjt i )) c] is the expected pro…ts of …rm i as of moment t i from waiting t < t M periods before investing. Thus, to prove the result it is enough to show that ( ) is maximized at t = in the set [max(0; ); min ( + ; t M + )] \ Z + . From (23), when t < , we have 00 (t) = p 0 00 (tjt i ) 2 ce t = p 0 a 2 ce t < 0. On the other hand, for < t < t M , we have 000 (t) = 3 ce t > 0.
Now …rstly, the condition p 1 a 2 0, ensures that ( ) 0. Secondly, the condition M C ; ( ) M B is equivalent to ( ) ( ). Therefore, since is concave for t and it is increasing at , it must be that it is increasing for all t and thus (t) ( ) for t . On the other hand, M B M C ; ( ) is equivalent to ( ) ( + ). Since 000 (t) > 0, it follows that once is convex, it will be convex for all higher values. Since ( ) ( + ), is decreasing at . But, can start increasing only after it becomes convex so after it starts increasing, it will increase forever. Since (31) , for the case < 1, and (2) for the case = 1, ensure that ( + ) < 0, it means that (t) < 0 for t + when + t M . Therefore, as desired, ( ) (t) for all 0 t + when + t M . Since there is no new information arrival after moment t M , it is straightforward to see that ( ) (t) for all 0 t t M when + t M .
Finally, note that when < 1, (30) is necessary to be satis…ed with equality to have the …rms willing to mix, while (31) is necessary because otherwise the …rms could deviate and invest after they remove all uncertainty.
Corollary 14
In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for …rms to wait for 2 Z + before investing is that:
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 13 and Corollary 11.
Proposition 15
In a symmetric equilibrium in which all …rms mix among investing at one of the two moments ; + 2 Z + and not investing at all, with probabilities 2 (0; 1), + 2 (0; 1) and 1 + + respectively, a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions is:
Proof. Assume all other …rms mix among investing at one of the two moments ; + 2 Z + and not investing at all, with probabilities 2 (0; 1), + 2 (0; 1) and 1 + + respectively. Then, as in (32) , denote by (t) p 0 (tjt i ) ce t and we will show that 00 (t) < 0 for t < and 000 (t) > 0 for t > + so that the argument from the proof of Proposition 13 will go through in this case as well with a slight modi…cation.
Employing (15), we have for t < that
On the other hand, 000 (t) = 3 ce t for all t. Note that 00 (t) < 0 for t < and 000 (t) > 0 for t > + . Moreover, it can be shown that lim We will argue now that ( ) (t) for all t 2 Z + . Consider two cases. Case 1: + . In this case, from (37) it follows that 00 (t) < 0 for t 2 ( ; + ). Therefore the function is concave for t < + . It is clear then that this and ( ) = ( + ) imply that 0 ( ) > 0 and 0 ( + ) < 0. 48 Since 000 (t) > 0 for t > + , and (36) implies (min( + + ; t M )) < 0, an argument similar to the one from the proof of Proposition 13 shows the result. Case 2: > + . In this case, 000 (t) > 0 for t together with the facts that lim t% + 00 (t) < lim t& + 00 (t) implies that once is convex, it will be convex for all higher values. If were increasing at + , then it should already be convex there and thus it would be increasing for all values above + . But this contradicts the fact that ( ) > 0 > (min( + + ; t M )). Therefore, 0 ( + ) < 0. Also, 0 ( ) > 0 because otherwise, in order for to be decreasing at + , it should have increased somewhere between and + , which would imply that was convex at that point and therefore convex and increasing from that point to + . But this would contradict the fact that should be decreasing at + . The rest of the argument goes as in the previous case.
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Proposition 16 For any P (p 0 ; ; ), denote by x, a maximal value of competition for which there exists a waiting time 2 Z + such that
Then, for any x > x, there is no equilibrium with …rms expecting strictly positive pro…ts.
Proof. Let ( ; x) be a pair with the properties from the text of the Claim. Then this pair must satisfy:
because otherwise there would exist a higher value of competition x 0 such that ( + ; x 0 ) would satisfy the properties from the text of the Claim. Now, when x increases above x, …rms would make strictly negative pro…ts if they were all to continue to invest at . Therefore, they would need to start investing at + or later. But, (39) is in that case inconsistent with the necessary conditions for a pure strategy equilibrium as de…ned by (33) .
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Proposition 17 Let x be any value of competition satisfying (39) . Then, for all values of x x there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for any value of p 0 ; one and only one of the following two cases is true:
1. there exists 2 Z + and 2 (0; 1) such that all …rms wait for a period 2 Z + and then in period mix between investing and not investing with probability . satis…es the condition:
2. there exists 2 Z + such that the equilibrium prescribes that all …rms mix among investing at one of the two moments ; + 2 Z + and not investing at all, with probabilities 2 (0; 1), + 2 (0; 1) and 1 + + respectively, satisfying:
The resulting equilibrium pro…le of p and thus of is weakly increasing in the degree of competition when x = and constant when x = a.
Proof. Denote by , the equilibrium waiting time at x and assuming for the time being that is not sustainable any type of equilibrium, denote by 1 be a minimal value of competition for which is an equilibrium waiting time in pure strategies. Note that at 1 , the …rms just switched from investing after + time units to investing after time units, so they were just indi¤erent between investing at and investing at + . Alternatively put, M C + ;1 ( ) = M C ;1 ( ) = M B. Now, in between 1 and x, M C + ;1 ( ) increases exceeding M B thus making …rms deviate and invest at if all other …rms were to invest at + . M C ;1 ( ) also increases above M B thus making the …rms want to invest at in an equilibrium in which all …rms invest at . At x though, the nonnegative pro…t constraint binds. Above x, if the all …rms were to continue to invest at , they would make negative pro…ts. To avoid this, …rms can either switch immediately to investing at + or can invest in fewer projects. But switching to investing at + immediately is not a feasible equilibrium strategy because M C + ;1 ( ) would still be higher than M B so provided that the rest of the …rms invest at + , any …rm would be better o¤ deviating and investing at . Therefore, the …rms need to start investing in fewer projects which would have the e¤ect of reducing the total measure of …rms in the market and thus allow for the non negative pro…ts condition to continue to be satis…ed. Now, by Corollary 12, we have that in an equilibrium in which all …rms mix with probability , the expected measure of …rms who already invested at t + t i is (tjt i ), with (tjt i ) as in Corollary 11. Note that since the …rm mixes in period between investing at that moment and never investing, its expected pro…ts from investing in period , p [1 , which is constant in a and decreasing in .
Clearly, M C ; ( ) = p a 1 1 2 satis…es the same properties.
Thus, when x = a, the conditions of Proposition 13 are satis…ed for = and (a) = On the other hand, M C ; ( ) ( ) and M C ; ( ) ( ) decrease when increases above . Since M C ; ( ) ( ) < M B < M C ; ( ) ( ), these inequalities will be also satis…ed for a range of values of above . Moreover, from the zero pro…t conditions at and , we have that a = a , so since 1 a j x=x < c, we will also have 1 a < c. Therefore, by Proposition 13, in equilibrium …rms will invest at with probability such that p [1 a 2 ] c = 0. Now, denote by 1 , the value of for which M C ; ( ) ( ) = M B and note that as increases above 1 , the equilibrium in which all …rms invest at is no longer sustainable. This is because M C ; ( ) ( ) < M B so the …rms would deviate and invest at + . However, note that immediately above 1 , a pro…le of strategies in which all …rms would mix at + does not constitute an equilibrium. To see this, denote by 0 the mixing probability at
= M B. Now, if immediately above 1 , …rms were to mix at + , in order for the zero pro…t condition to be satis…ed, since the …rms invest in safer projects, should have an immediate upward jump to 00 > ( 1 ), where 00 satis…es p + [1 a 00 1 2 ] c = 0. But then, M C + ; 00 ( ) = p a 00 1
So if all the other …rms invest at + , any …rms would have an incentive to deviate and invest at .
Therefore, for a range of values of above 1 , …rms would mix among investing at , investing at + and not investing at all. The corresponding mixing probabilities and + will be given by the zero pro…t conditions as in (41) and (42) . Note that
is increasing in . Therefore, since + ( 1 ) = 0, we will have 1 a [ ( ) + + ( )] < 1 a ( 1 ) 1 < c so by Proposition 15, this will constitute an equilibrium strategy.
As increases above 1 , ( ) decreases and + ( ) increases. Denote by 2 the value of that satis…es ( ) = 0. Then, as competition increases above 1 the equilibrium prescribes that the …rms gradually shift the weight of the mixing probabilities from moment towards moment + , until at 2 , …rms no longer invest at , and mix only between investing and not investing at + with probability + ( 2 ). Note that above 2 , the equilibrium in which …rms mix at and + no longer exists. However, it can be shown that at 2 , we have M C + ; + ( 2 ) ( ) = M C ; + ( 2 ) ( ) = M B. Using the same arguments as before, it can be shown that above 2 , it is an equilibrium for all …rms to mix at + , with a decreasing probability. As shown in Claim 18, M C + ; ( ) ( + ) and M C + ; ( ) ( ) will be decreasing until 2 where M C + ; ( ) ( + ) = M B and the …rms will start mixing among investing at + , investing at + 2 and not investing at all and then the process will repeat.
Finally, the fact that ( ) is decreasing in , while + ( ) is increasing also shows that there can be no equilibrium in which …rms mix at two moments for those values of competition for which there exists an equilibrium that prescribes …rms to mix only at one moment. To see this, note that whenever …rms mix at two moments, the mixing probability on the later moment should increase in in order for the …rms to make zero pro…ts at both of those moments. However, we know that at 1 …rms are making zero pro…t at both and + , while the mixing probability at + is zero. Therefore,that probability could have not increased below 1 .
The argument for the case in which is sustainable in a mixed strategy equilibrium is similar to the one above. If x := a …rms start mixing immediately above x between investing at and not investing at all, with probabilities strictly lower than 1. If x := , then immediately above x, …rms mix among investing at , investing at and not investing at all. As competition continues to increase, the weight on decreases, while the weight on increases until a point at which …rms mix only between investing after time units and not investing at all. Then the rest of the argument is as above. This completes the proof of Proposition 17.
Appendix B4.
Assume …rst that ln p 0 2 Z + , so that t M = ln p 0 and p t M = e p t M = 1. Then, condition (29) from the text of Proposition 13 becomes M C t M ; (t M ) M B, because the marginal bene…t of waiting at t M is zero. In the text of the Corollary 14 this condition becomes c 0 are satis…ed, …rms wait precisely t M periods in equilibrium. Since these two conditions are satis…ed precisely when the level of competition is small, we conclude as expected that when for low enough values of competition, …rms wait until they remove all uncertainty.
On the other hand, if x that satis…es 1 a 2 c x=x = 0, also satis…es 1, then no pure strategy equilibrium exists for x > x; this is the counterpart of Proposition 16. Thus, for x > x, as in Proposition 17, …rms start mixing. While M C t M ; (x) (t M ) is weakly decreasing in x, where (x) is de…ned as in the text of Claim 18, the fact that the marginal bene…t of waiting at t M is zero induces …rms to invest no later than t M . Since M C t M ; (x) (t M ) is also weakly decreasing in x, …rms will never invest earlier than t M . Thus, in this case, the equilibrium will specify that all …rms wait precisely t M periods and invest with probability (x). When ln p 0 = 2 Z + , the main di¤erence is that if M C t M ; (t M ) is smaller than the marginal bene…t of waiting at t M , which is c(1 p t M ) …rms will invest at t M + , but the rest of the analysis is similar. , that is when M B M C 0;1 (0) and the non-negative pro…t condition is satis…ed at belief p 0 , then …rms invest in development of the new product as soon as they learn of it. Since . For high enough levels of competition, the non negative pro…t condition is no longer satis…ed and thus …rms will start mixing. As in Proposition 17, if x = a they will mix immediately, while if x = then they will start mixing later as x increases. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. c(e 1) a ; 1
As c increases above c k , (47) reduces to and note then that for a …xed value of c, the set of values of competition for which p (k+1) is sustainable in a pure strategy equilibrium is given by x 0 (c) x x(c). De…ne x L x 0 (c k ) and note when the cost of innovation is just above c k , the values of competition for which this equation is satis…ed are precisely the ones that satisfy x L x x M . It is straightforward to see that both x 0 (c) and x(c) is increasing. However, as c increases, since x(c) increases, at some point c 0 k we will have . De…ne x H x(c 0 k ) and note that in fact it does not depend on k. When c increases above c 0 k , the non negative pro…t condition will bind for some values of competition and the upper bound x(c) will be de…ned by the equation: 
Clearly, x(c) is decreasing in c. It is straightforward to see that the two bounds, x 0 (c) and x(c), will be equal precisely when (45) is satis…ed. De…ne c k+1 to be the smallest value higher than c k for which x 0 (c k+1 ) = x(c k+1 ). 
It is straightforward to see that as s increases, 0 (s) and 1 (s) increase, while 2 (s) is constant so (s) minf 1 (s); 2 (s)g is weakly increasing. Denote by s 0 the minimum value of s for which 0 is sustainable and by s 1 the value of s such that 0 (s 1 ) = (s 1 ). When s increases above s 1 , 0 is no longer sustainable in a pure strategy equilibrium and the new minimum pure strategy equilibrium waiting time is 0 + . Clearly, 0 (s) as given by (51) will have a downward jump to the value that satis…es the equation:
The rest of the values of s k can be computed iteratively in a similar manner. Finally, to see that Take some k 2 f1; :::; n 1g arbitrarily, and denote by: which can be rewritten, using the fact that e (t k ) p t = p + k , as:
Note that given its de…nition in (55), h(t) represents the deviation pro…t from investing at + k to investing at some other point t. Thus, in order for this to be an equilibrium, we would …rstly need to have h(t) 0 for all t 2 Z + . 50 Secondly, the fact that the …rm is willing to mix between investing at moments + k and + l implies that h( + l ) = 0, for all l 2 f1; :::; ng. Now, using Lemma 9, we have that for each m 2 f1; :::; n 1g and for all t 2 [ + m ; + m+1 ]:
h(t) = p + k i (57) Firstly, since by Corollary 10, 0 (tjt i ) is continuous, it follows immediately that h 0 (t) is also continuous. By considering for each term in the sum that gives h(t), the cases when t + j + and then t > + j + , it is straightforward to see that we can write concisely: 
For t 2 ( + m ; + m+1 ) n S n j=0 f + j + g, we also have:
h 000 (t) = 3 ce
Take k = 1, and assume k+1 k < , in which case 1 ft + j + g = 1, for all t 2 ( + k ; + k+1 ) and j 2 f1; :::; ng. Note that lim t% + m h 00 (t) < lim t& + m h 00 (t) for m 2 fk; k + 1g and h 000 (t) > 0 imply that h 00 (t) is strictly increasing on [0; + k+1 ]. Therefore, there exists t 2 [0; + k+1 ], such that h 00 (t) < 0 for t 2 [0; t), and h 00 (t) > 0 for t 2 (t; + k+1 ]. On the other hand, since h is continuous on [ + k ; + k+1 ], and since h( + k ) = h( + k+1 ) = 0, we have either h 0 ( + k ) < 0 < h 0 ( + k+1 ) or h 0 ( + k ) > 0 > h 0 ( + k+1 ).
Case 1: h 0 ( + k ) < 0 < h 0 ( + k+1 ). This means that h 0 ( ) must be already increasing at + k+1 , so t < + k+1 . Thus, h 00 (t) > 0 for all t > + k+1 and since h 0 ( + k+1 ) > 0 and h 0 ( ) is continuous, it must be that h 0 (t) > 0 for all t 2 [ + k+1 ; + ]. In particular, h( + k+1 + ) > 0, so this case cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that k+1 k .
Case 2: h 0 ( + k ) > 0 > h 0 ( + k+1 ). We will show that in this case, it must be that k+1 k = . To see this, assume by contradiction that k+1 k 2 , and note that in that case, we must have h( + k + ) < 0, because otherwise the …rm would deviate and invest at + k + . Since h is continuous and h 0 ( + k+1 ) < 0, there must exist some t 0 2 ( + k + ; + k+1 ) such that h 0 (t 0 ) > 0, because h must be strictly positive just below + k+1 . Similarly, there must exist some t 00 2 ( + k ; + k + ) such that h 0 (t 00 ) < 0. But since h 0 (t 00 ) < 0 < h 0 (t 0 ), it means that h 0 is already increasing at t 0 , so h 0 ( + k+1 ) > h(t 0 ) > 0. This contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, if k+1 k < , it must be that k+1 k = .
Therefore, the analysis of the two cases reveals that in order to have an equilibrium, we must either have h 0 ( + 1 ) < 0 and 2
1
, or h 0 ( + 1 ) > 0 and 2 1 = .
If h 0 ( + 1 ) < 0, then note that since 2
, then it must be that 1 ft + 1 + g = 0, for all t 2 ( + 2 ; + 3 ) and 1 ft + j + g = 1, for all t 2 ( + 2 ; + 3 ) and j 2 f2; :::; ng. Therefore, h 00 is again increasing on ( + 2 ; + 3 ). So repeating the argument in Case 2 above, we conclude that it must be that 3 2 = , and that h 0 ( + 3 ) < 0. Assume now that 4 3 < ( 1) , and note that in this case, we have 1 ft + 1+ g = 0 for all t 2 ( + 3 ; + 4 ) and 1 ft + j + g = 1, for all t 2 ( + 3 ; + 4 ) and j 2 f2; :::; ng. Therefore, repeating the argument that we used for the Case 1 above, we conclude that this cannot be part an equilibrium. Thus, it must be that 4 3 ( 1) and h 0 ( + 3 ) > 0. Then, using the same type of arguments, it follows that If h 0 ( + 1 ) > 0, then h 0 ( + 2 ) < 0 and it can be showed as we did above for Case 1, that unless 3 2 > ( 1) , this cannot be part of an equilibrium. It follows then iteratively that it must be that 4 3 = , 5 4 ( 2) , 6 5 = and so on.
Therefore, in order to have an equilibrium in which …rms mix between investing at various moments in time, the function h should have an extremely speci…c shape, in which it takes values of 0 at points in between which the distances alternate between very large and very small values. Generically, such a shape is impossible to be attained. For instance, consider the following virtually randomly chosen values of the parameters:
= 0:4, = 0:2, = 5 and assume that there is an equilibrium in which …rms mix between innovating after three di¤erent waiting times. By Lemma 19, the three waiting times can either be (i ) , + + and + + or (ii ) , + and
